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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
All Determinative Authority has been previously identified in Appellees' primary brief. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellees, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine ("Medicine") and Lonnie E. Paulos, 
M.D., P.C. ("Paulos") and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C. ("Rosenburg") rely on the case 
ofSchafirv. Harrigan 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) for the proposition that Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-56.5 (1992) supports the trial court's award of attorneys fees to them in this case. These 
parties also argue that the statute is not ambiguous, and therefore, this court cannot look to the 
statute's legislative history for assistance in interpreting its application. 
Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation ("Rehabilitation") admits that the Schafir case 
would suggest that this Court did not disagree that the trial court has discretion under § 
78-27-56.5 to award fees despite language in the contract quite similar to the language in this 
case. However, the case is factually distinguishable. To begin with, the primary issue before 
this court in Schafir was whether the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to allocate 
fees attributable to claims under the contract. With numerous claims among numerous parties, 
some of which were not parties to the contract which provided for the fees, it is easy to see why 
the court of appeals held as it did. 
From the language of the opinion, it is clear that the appellants did not challenge the 
applicability of the statute to the language at issue, but instead relied on the fact that an 
allocation of fees is in the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, Rehabilitation respectfully 
asserts that the issue contained in this appeal has not yet been decided. Rehabilitation also 
respectfully asserts that the complaint in Schafir was a breach of contract action, whereas in this 
case the trial court was dealing with a Declaratory Judgment action. Therefore, from a public 
policy standpoint, to affirm the trial court's award of attorneys fees in this case would have a 
chilling effect on a party seeking a judicial opinion as to disputed contract language. 
Medicine, Paulos and Rosenberg also argue that, since the statute is not ambiguous, this 
court cannot look to its legislative history in an attempt to determine its intended applicability. 
To begin with, Rehabilitation believes that the plain language of the agreement in this case 
precludes the award of attorneys fees - period, and the statute does not apply to alter this result. 
However, given Medicine's interpretation of the statutory language, it is subject to two quite 
distinct, and in light of the Schafir case, plausible interpretations. It must, therefore be, 
ambiguous. (See Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1989).) As 
a result, this court may look to its legislative history to resolve the issue on appeal. 
Specifically, the statute allows a trial court to award fees to either party where the 
contract "allow[s] at least one party to recover attorney's fees." As the court is well aware, 
certain contracts only expressly allow one party, (e.g. the landlord, the bank, the creditor, the 
party in the strongest negotiating position) to recover attorney's fees in the event of a dispute, 
in a blatant attempt to exclude the other party (e.g. the tenant, the debtor, the party in the 
weakest negotiating position) from the same rights and benefits. It is to these circumstances that 
the statute was meant to apply. Conversely, it should not be applied to alter contractual rights 
where parties of equal bargaining positions negotiate a contract and limit their rights equally. 
In this instance, the attorney's fees provision of the Purchase Agreement is already 
reciprocal. To begin with, there is a condition precedent: "Should either party default in or 
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breach any of the covenants or agreements contained herein..." Neither party did; therefore 
neither party is obligated to pay the other's fees. The result urged by Medicine, Paulos and 
Rosenberg results in the court rewriting a contract, and making a better bargain for one party 
than the party made for itself. This is clearly beyond the authority of the trial court, and is 
egregious where the party benefiting from the Court's interference is the party which drafted the 
contract. Instead, it should be construed against them. (See Sears v. Reimersma 655 P.2d 1105 
(Utah 1982) and Rio Algom Corp v. Jimco Ltd. 618 P.2d 497.505 (Utah 1980).) 
Although Medicine, Paulos and Rosenberg argue that the case cited by Rehabilitation, 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) has been overruled by the statute, this is far 
from clear. In Faulkner, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the plain and unambiguous language 
of the contract to reach its decision; as argued above, this was not the issue in Schafir. 
Therefore, Rehabilitation believes that Faulkner is much more applicable to the facts of this case 
than is Schafir. 
The interpretation offered by Medicine, Paulos and Rosenberg is a tortured interpretation 
of the plain meaning of the statute. If the statutory language is in fact subject to this 
interpretation, then it is ambiguous as a matter of law, and the interpretation offered by 
Medicine, Paulos and Rosenberg is contrary to the legislative intent. It flies in the face of other 
principles of law such as the principles governing contract interpretation and enforceability. The 
trial court's award of attorneys fees should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plain meaning of the language employed by the parties in this case precluded the 
lower court's award of attorneys fees to the appellees. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-56.5 (1992) do not apply to alter this conclusion. Instead, the contract was negotiated 
between parties of equal bargaining power, and the lower court erred in rewriting the contract 
for the benefit of one party. It was drafted by Appellees and should be construed against them. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the lower court's award of attorneys 
fees and costs to the Appellees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s v ^ day of (jpf
 s , 1995. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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